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ABSTRACT i
 
One of the few new economic developmeht programs to emerge in the
 
1980s are the Enterprise Zones (EZs). This new economic development
 
strategy provides incentives to businesses investing in designated distressed
 
areas. The areas designated as EZs are within communities that are
 
considered economically depressed with higher than average unemployment
 
rates. By offering incentives and programs only available in an EZ,it is hoped
 
these areas can attract and retain companies that would not locate, stay or
 
expand there otherwise. Zone economic activity is measured by the number
 
of jobs created. The proposed research constitutes a more definitive test of
 
this hypothesis.
 
This research effort will entail the collection and analysis of secondary
 
data to test the effectiveness of Enterprise Zones on job creation in general,
 
operationalized by such indicators as building permits,new business licenses,
 
capital improvements,employment activity and employment vouchers.
 
There is much to recommend the idea that engaging a community in
 
securing its future through improved services, job training, beatification
 
efforts, and business loans can create change. This is the recurring rhessage
 
from both the research literature and the local administrators. Although
 
some important questions remain about the permanence of the jobs created,
 
most empirical assessments have concluded that state EZ programs are
 
effective in creating jobs at reasonable costs. Increased zone benefits will help
 
economic development leaders achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the
 
financial disadvantages of urban sites, allowing business to focus on their
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merits. Allowing such opportunities and trying to boost the local economic
 
development ideas that are working the best, are the key objectives of the EZ
 
plan.
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The Research Problem.
 
Plant closings and unemployment in basic industries have become
 
painfully frequent occurrences in many regions of the United States.
 
Although "deindustrialization" has recently emerged as a political and
 
economic issue,(Green 1991) it is by no means a new phenomenon. The
 
economic base of the United States has changed considerably throughout its
 
history. Moststates have thus witnessed a succession of declines in particular
 
industries. The manufacturing base by 1970 was very different from that of
 
1920 or 1880(Green 1991). This dynamic change places large demands on the
 
evolving economic development arena'solving economic development
 
problems. Economic development is a multifaceted issue, a compound-

complex problem. Any economic development program is judged by its
 
ability to create jobs,promote economic stability,increase property values and
 
expand opportunities to achieve good "quality of life" (Lyons and Hamlin
 
1991).
 
One of the few new economic development programs to emerge in the
 
1980s are the Enterprise Zones (EZs). This new economic development
 
strategy provides incentives to businesses investing in designated distressed
 
areas. Originally conceived in Great Britain in the late 1970s by Peter Hall,
 
(Lyons and Hamlin 1991)the EZ approach immigrated to the United States in
 
the early 1980s, where it was extensively modified and adopted by state
 
governments (Reeder and Robinson 1992). Zone economic activity is
 
measured by the number of jobs created. The proposed research constitutes a
 
more definitive test of this hypothesis.
 
When the EZ concept was first unveiled in the United States in 1979,it
 
was hardly surprising that the radical free market development strategy
 
should appeal to conservatives like then-Gongressman Jack Kemp,a New
 
York Republican, and Bronx Democrat, Robert Garcia, willing to try another
 
approach in areas where programs of the 1960s and 1970s fell short(Guskind
 
1990). To these politicians, the proposal was in effect, a supply-side program
 
to save the inner cities: it was the urban complement to the general
 
conservative strategy of cutting taxes and regulations to stimulate economic
 
growth. The proposal was eagerly adopted and an enterprise zone bill was
 
introduced in May 1980. Ronald Reagan adopted EZs as the centerpiece of his
 
urban proposals during the 1980 election. Enterprise zones became official
 
Reagan Administration policy in 1981(Green 1991).
 
A federal enterprise zone plan actually became law in 1988,but it lacked
 
teeth and was never carried out. Congress agreed on a more comprehensive
 
plan in 1992 as part of a broad tax bill, only to have President George Bush
 
veto it. In May 1993,President Bill Clinton announced a measure called the
 
Economic Empowerment Act of 1993. On December 21, 1994, the President
 
and \/ice President A1 Gore announced the designation of104 urban and rural
 
Empowerment Zones (EZs) and Enterprise Communities (ECs) across the
 
country. Whatever they are called, these zones are economic development
 
tools established in areas that need extra help to become well-developed and
 
prosperous. Taking a page from state efforts. President Clinton emphasized
 
the coordination of government aid to distressed areas,rather than tax breaks
 
for businesses that locate there. The EZ/EC initiative is designed to restore
 
opportunity to distressed communities by providing the tools they need and
 
the flexibility they desire, enabling them to rebuild and revitalize, create new
 
jobs and opportunities,and empower residents to reach their fullest potential.
 
At the same time, it demands responsibility from local governments,
 
community organizations, the private sector, universities, and individuals to
 
develop - and take advantage of - a comprehensive plan that meets local
 
needs. When he did recommend tax incentives, the President stressed tax
 
credits for education and training. Preyious Republican proposals focused
 
primarily on helping zone businesses raise capital. The ultimate goal ofzone
 
programs is to make urban business sites more competitive with those in the
 
suburbs and more rural areas.
 
This ideology (the EZ theory), rests squarely oh the assumption that a
 
mutually dependent and beneficial relationship is formed when, in turn
 
businesses which locate or expand in the EZ,provide the community with a
 
variety oflong term benefits. For example,these businesses employ the area's
 
residents, thus decreasing the area's unemployment rate, increase the
 
community's tax base, diversify and stabilize the economic base,increase the
 
area's per capita income,and encourage support industries to locate nearby.
 
By contrast, critics Of the EZ theory, argue that the EZs reliance on
 
business tax incentives amount to a giveaway to business. According to the
 
"zero sum" theory,(Reeder and Robinson 1992)they argue that gains received
 
by EZs may come at the expense of other similarly situated places which do
 
not have the advantage of EZ status. To them,EZs are a wasteful,expensive
 
means of encouraging economic development. Another criticism is that it
 
creates competition among cities and states that can ultimately damage the
 
local tax structure and shift business costs to state and local governments or to
 
existing local businesses. Such costs often outweigh the economic benefits
 
gained from industry's relocation in a state or locality. But,it is difficult to
 
argUe that this kind of growth comes at the expense of other areas. Thus,this
 
proposed study offers an empirical test of heretofore competing theories of
 
Enterprise Zones.
 
Zone economic activity is measured by the number ofjobs created. The
 
proposed research will constitute a more definitive test of the Enterprise Zone
 
hypothesis. The researcher conected 7years(1986- 1992)of AMIGA(the Agua
 
Mansa Industrial Growth Association) data on Agua ManSa (a state
 
designated) EZ cphamU (cities of Riverside, Colton and Rialto, areas
 
within counties of San Bernardino and Riverside), in order to conduct a
 
longitudinal study, testing the effects over tinae of EZs as stipulated by
 
dependent ("Y", "effect" or "then") variables, including building permits,
 
new business licenses, capital improvements, employment activity and
 
employment vouchers. This approach surveyed EZfirms(those receiving EZ
 
benefits) about the effect of EZ policies on job creation. It compared successive
 
zone employment growth prior to EZ designation.
 
Of course, the issue of EZs, however important to proponents and
 
detractors alike,is not the only issue in the social, political, and economic life
 
of a community. Consequently, though signifiGant in its own right(whether
 
confirmed or not) as a source of important implications for the literature of
 
economic development and community planning, the EZ concept is not a
 
replacement for broader theories concerning local economic development.
 
In summary,this proposal sets forth some practical objectives. First,
 
knowing about EZs' abilities to promote successful economic development
 
can assist policy makers, consultants, citizen organizations and others in
 
formulating policies to enhance the long-term benefits of their communities.
 
Second, understanding the EZ concept can aid in devising ways to enhance
 
inclusiveness (EZs as economic development tools) in local policy making,
 
especially as more communities engage in strategic planning to cope with the
 
economic and social changes of the 1970s,1980s and 1990s. Third, statistical
 
analysis of the relationship between economic development policies and EZs
 
can assist local leaders in critically examining alternative strategies for local
 
economic development. Finally, this research will provide a data base for
 
continuous evaluation and monitoring of the relationships among EZs and
 
community long-term benefits.
 
CHAPTER II
 
REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OFTHE LITERATURE
 
Previous Research Studies On Enterprise Zones
 
Proponents of the EZ program (the EZ theory) assume a mutually
 
dependent and beneficial relationship is formed when businesses which
 
locate or expand in the EZ provide the community with a variety of long­
term benefits. For example,these businesses employ the area's residents thus
 
decreasing the area's unemployment rate, business growth increases the
 
community's tax base, diversifies and stabilizes the economic base,increases
 
the area's per capita income, and encourages support industries to locate
 
nearby. Critics of the EZ programs argue that it is difficult if notimpossible to
 
use EZs to target assistance to blighted areas. Atbest,they claim thatEZs are a
 
zero-sum game, transferring investments from nonzone areas to zones.
 
Further, they contend that an effective EZ program will require direct
 
expenditures in human and physical infrastriictures.
 
A review of EZ literature would not be complete without considering
 
the works of Reeder and Robinson(1),Guskind (2),and Rubin and Wilder(3).
 
These works present a generally positive picture of EZs. On the other hand,
 
the anti-EZ thesis is taken up by Levifan and Miller (4), Osborne (5), and
 
Stodghill II, Cole and McGuire(6).
 
Reeder & Robinson argue that recent empirical studies employing
 
sophisticated methodologies raise questions about earlier studies of taxes and
 
economic development. They suggest that taxes may significantly affect
 
business location decisions, at least under certain circumstances (qtd. in
 
Newman & Sullivan 1988, Nelson 1989). They stipulate that in addition,
 
most state EZ programs feature nontax provisions that improve local
 
planning, public services (especially services for businesses), and
 
infrastructure directed at removing barriers to local economic development
 
(qtd. in Underhill 1989, Wolf 1990). These nontax provisions are thought to
 
foster the growth and survival of indigenous small businesses. It is then
 
difficult to argue that this kind of growth comes at the expense of other areas.
 
Even where EZs cause firms to relocate,this can result in both efficiency
 
and equity gains if firms move from wealthy,congested,high-cost areas to less
 
wealthy,low-cost areas that have excess capacity of public infrastructure,as is
 
the situation with many distressed rural areas(qtd. in Rubin and Wilder 1989,
 
U.S. General Accounting Office 1988). Thus,the zero sum argument has less
 
validity in the case of EZs.
 
Reeder and Robinson further discuss the two approaches that are most
 
often used to assess EZ policies. One approach surveys EZ firms (those
 
receiving EZ benefits) or local EZ coordinators about the effect of EZ policies
 
on job creation, Survey responses are then converted into gross and net job
 
growth numbers (net of jobs unaffected by EZ); sometimes multipliers are
 
used to estimate indirect job growth associated with EZs. The other approach
 
compares total zone employment growth with either zone employment
 
growth prior to EZ designation or contemporary growth in a non-EZ portion
 
of county. State, nation. Of particular interest, they pointed to recent
 
assessments of EZ programs iii seven states: California (qtd. in California
 
Office of the Auditor General 1988),New Jersey(qtd.in Rubin and Armstrong
 
1989), Kansas (qtd. in Patterson and Ambrozier 1988), Illinois (qtd. in Elder
 
and Cohen 1988),New York (qtd. in Hamilton,Rabinovitz,and Alschuler,Inc.
 
1990), Wginia (qtd. in yirginia Department of Hptising and Community
 
Development 1987)/ and Louisiana (qtd. in Louisiana Department of
 
Economic Development 1990). They found that: (a) EZs have generally
 
outperformed non-EZ portions of the State in employment growth, and (b)
 
one-half or more of the new or expanding firms that substantially increased
 
employment in EZs indicated that EZ policies contributed to their actions.
 
Reeder and Robinson also pointed to several of the state studies that
 
produced estimates of cost per job. They figured that if all new jobs reported
 
by EZfirms(gross jobs)are counted,the gross cost perjob ranged from $437in
 
Virginia to $5,613 in New Jersey. Costs are higher after netting out those jobs
 
that could not be attributed to EZ policy. Netjob costs ranged from $4,117 in
 
Evansville,Indiana to $13,070 in New Jersey. When indirectjobs are counted,
 
costs per net job were significantly lower,$3171,in New Jersey. These costs
 
appear quite reasonable when compared with other economic development
 
and job creation programs. Thus, using varying methodologies, most
 
assessments have concluded that EZs appear to be cost effective in creating
 
jobs.
 
Examining few studies of other economic impacts of EZs,they found the
 
results generally favorable. For example, substantial new investment is
 
associated with EZs in most states. In California,EZs performed better than
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non-EZs in trends in unemployment rates, assessed property values, and
 
number of public assistance recipients(qtd. in California Office of the Auditor
 
General 1988). In Illinois, EZs outperformed the rest of the state in reducing
 
unemployment rates, but this was thought to be coincidental,since there was
 
little correlation between individual EZ job growth and decline in EZ
 
unemployment rates (qtd. in Elder and Cohen 1988). Other studies also have
 
found that many of the jobs created have been by existing firms and small
 
businesses and relatively few jobs have actually relocated from other areas;
 
thus experts have concluded that there is little danger that EZs amount to a
 
"zero sum game."
 
Reeder and Robinson concluded that although some important
 
questions remain about the permanence of the jobs created, most empirical
 
assessments have concluded that state enterprise zone programs are effective
 
in creating jobs at a reasonable cost.
 
Guskind strongly supports the EZ theory of job creation. He cites
 
versions of this theory being tested in more than 500 "active" state enterprise
 
zones(more than 1,500 have been designated). Citing the states of Louisiana,
 
Illinois, Connecticut, Ohio, New Jersey, Kentucky and Missouri, he
 
underlined spectacular results of their progranas. Based on state estimates,
 
HUD (Housing & Urban Development), in 1987, reported that enterprise
 
zones had saved or created about 180,00 jobs and attracted $8.8 billion in
 
private capital. A more recent survey by Business Facilities magazine
 
(February 1990) he continued, estimated that enterprise zones had created
 
184,600 new johs/ retained 169,100 jot)s and attracted $18,1 billion in
 
investment through 1988.
 
Guskind points to further evidence of the successes of EZin creating
 
jobs. Evansville,Indiana set up its two-and-half-square-mile enterprise zones
 
in 1984 in a neighborhood that back in the 1950s, hosted 15,000 workers,
 
mostly in factory jobs. By the time the zone opened, employment had
 
plummeted to 4/400. Evansville and the state had invested about $4 million
 
in public money in the zone to upgrade water mains,build a firehouse,set up
 
a day-care center for employees and provide other amenities. The
 
investment appeared to have paid off. There were 260 businesses in the zone
 
when it opened. There are now more than 340. Total employment has
 
jumped more than 50%.
 
Guskind concluded his argument with a quote by Alan Eric Jones,
 
Executive Director of the Evansville Urban Enterprise Association "The
 
enterprise zone is a targeted,focused program. It doesn't just throw money
 
around. And it creates high paying jobs,not hotel jobs"(51).
 
Rubin and Wilder analyze the effectiveness ofEZon creating jobs from
 
a different perspective. According to them, there is little evidence
 
demonstrating that the EZ concept is effective at generating new economic
 
development at the local level. Further,they content that previous research
 
on enterprise zones does not take into account external effects that may
 
stimulate or deter economic growth within a zone. So, their study had
 
sought to mitigate these problems by carrying out a disaggregated analysis of
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new job development within an enterprise zone,and by presenting a method
 
that enables external growth stimuli and industrial composition to be factored
 
out of the enterprise zone evaluation process.
 
Their study also sought to add to the currently small body of empirical
 
research that examines the effectiveness of enterprise zones as economic
 
development tools. The study provided an analysis of the employment
 
benefits and incentive costs of the aforementioned Evansville, Indiana,
 
enterprise zone program from 1983 through 1986. Study findings suggested
 
that the EZ in Evansville has been a relatively cost-effective job-generation
 
tool. Results of a shift-share analysis reveal significant differences between
 
the employment growth of the enterprise zone and that of the metropolitan
 
area. Additional cost-per-job analysis revealed a more complex relationship
 
between job creation, firm type, and firm size than is generally assumed in
 
economic development literature.
 
Throughout the article, empirical evidence was presented regarding key
 
issues raised in the debate over the effectiveness of enterprise zone programs.
 
From the analysis, they concluded that the EZ concept can be a cost-effective
 
local economic development tool.
 
Levitan and Miller from the other side of the fence, contend that even
 
in the best of times, poverty and high unemployment remain the rule for
 
blighted areas. Empirical evidence is lacking that reducing federal taxes and
 
relaxing regulations will alleviate the problems of inner cities. Taxes play at
 
best a secondary role in business investment decisions. Other factors they
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noted, (including the availability of a skilied labor force, proxiniity to
 
transportation and markets,local amenities, and the physical security of the
 
sites) play a far more important role when businesses consider expansion,
 
relocation> or starting a hew venture. High unemployment, poverty, and
 
crime weigh against investing in blighted areas, as do dilapidated
 
infrastructures and inferior services and amenities. Modest tax incentives
 
and deregulation alone do not provide adequate inducements to offset the
 
deterrents of locating in a blighted area. Tax incentives and deregulation,
 
however, would have at best a nominal impact in increasing the number of
 
startup businesses. Entrepreneurs, they contend, do not decide to start
 
businesses because of marginal tax relief. In addition, most small firms
 
would be unable to utilize the tax credits offered in EZlegislation,because few
 
businesses in their early years have the tax liabilities needed to take advantage
 
oftaxbreaks.
 
Levitan and Miller analyze the two policy options for administering aid
 
to designated areas. These are tax expenditures and direct subsidies.
 
Advocates of unfettered free markets argue that policies based on direct
 
assistance have failed because their reliance on subsidies fosters a dependence
 
on government handouts. This, they assert, stifles free enterprise and
 
interferes with market forces. They contend that tax breaks, in contrast,
 
encourage free enterprise and business growth. The distinction free market
 
advocates draw between direct subsidies and tax exemptions is not persuasive:
 
both policies distort free-market operations. EZs are subsections of larger
 
economic markets, yet tax breaks and deregulation apply only to the zones.
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Enterprise zone theory is premised on gbvemment intervention in the
 
market to favor a designated area. It follows that the subsidies accompanying
 
designation may diminish the competitive capabilities of firms outside the
 
boundaries of the zone,which may be equally depressed. Due to government
 
intervention, these firms will have a distinct disadvantage compared to their
 
zone competitors.
 
Compared with direct subsidies,revenue foregone through the tax code
 
is normally an ineffective mechanism for revitalizing blighted areas. Tax
 
expenditures in EZ legislation have few strings attached to their use.
 
Therefore, there is no guarantee that the income produced by the tax
 
expenditures will benefit the zones or its residents. A company can choose to
 
pocket profits generated by the tax credits rather than reinvest in the zone or
 
hire zone residents. Direct government grants or subsidized loans usually
 
provide safeguards,requiring use for their intended purposes.
 
Levitan and Miller further analyzed the "empowerment" ideology of
 
EZs. Empowerment it seems, will help the poor in the blighted areas and
 
enable them to forge their destinies. The rhetoric surrounding EZs distorts
 
reality and tends to obfuscate the needs of blighted area residents along with
 
the real costs of their rehabilitation. Empowerment cannot be achieved on
 
the cheap and is not a substitute for direct help. The overall effectiveness of
 
the EZ program is problematic. Legislation does not address the principal
 
cause of distress - the idleness or waste of blighted area residents.
 
Empowering zone residents requires that they become economically self-

sufficient. Tax expenditures will not accomplish this, nor will they provide
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the mechanisms heecieci to -'empdwer- zone residents.; Many reside lack
 
the basic skills needed for mostjobs.
 
Assisting the residents entails improving their education and skill
 
levels. Once the residents are able to compete effectively for employment,it
 
will then not be necessary to bring job opportunities to their back yards.
 
Equipped with the necessary skills, they will in addition, be able to travel
 
outside the zone to earn a living. Improvements in amenities and
 
infrastructure should address, at a minimum,transportation facilities, police
 
protection, and the educational and training system. This, assert Levitan and
 
Miller, is the most effective Strategy to empower the residents of blighted
 
communities. They concluded that it is difficult if not impossible to use
 
enterprise zones to target assistance to blighted areas. They claim that at best,
 
EZs are a zero-sum game, transferring investments from nonzone to zone
 
areas. An effective enterprise zone program will require direct expenditures,
 
direct investments in human and physical infrastructures.
 
Osborne contends that the Jack Kemp's tax-driven version of the
 
Enterprise Zone does not work. He takes the conservative notion that
 
creating a healthy marketsimply by cutting taxes and regulations is simplistic.
 
The rhetoric question that would be asked is,"how much of a difference are
 
low taxes going to make in areas that already have low rents and low wages?"
 
Such communities also have sagging infrastructures, poor housing, and a
 
shortage of educated,skilled workers - not to mention crime,drugs,illiteracy,
 
and welfare dependency. To create a healthy market,this entire constellation
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of social pathologies/unskilled labor, arid inadequate services must be
 
addressed and altered. And if that is to happeri,government mustthen play a
 
central role. The keys to s^ are active development strategies,involving
 
business, government, and the local community.
 
/ To back Up his argument, Osborrie states that the idea pf EZs is an
 
import. This is true. Peter Hall> a sdcialist professor in Great Britain,
 
proposed it after a look at the low-tax,low-wage vitality of Horig Kong. Hall
 
suggested "freeports" in the worst areas of the inner city: small enclaves free
 
of taxes, regulations,customs controls, duties and a minimum wage. Things
 
looked bleak, nothing else had worked, so why not try something truly
 
audacious? This was an attempt to re-create the Hong Kong of the 1950s arid
 
1960s inside inner Liverpoolor inner Glasgow. The British example,Osborne
 
asserts is a classic exercise in steering investment to a place, rather than to
 
people. This,he continues,is fine, albeit expensive,if the goal is to redevelop
 
a place. He cites a similar strategy that has helped lure private investment
 
back to Times Square in New York. It could also work to lure plants back to
 
areas that have lost their manufacturing base but still have a skilled work
 
force and an adequate infrastructure. He believes that in fact, the state zones
 
that do work are in precisely these kinds of areas.
 
Underlining his argument, he cites several studies. Two studies each
 
in Connecticut and Maryland found no impact. Studies in Illinois and
 
Louisiana found little change. A study of Indiana's "most successful" zone
 
found genuine progress, but its authors attributed the success not to tax and
 
regulatory incentives but to the aggressive recruitment work,backed by hefty
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training and ihfrastruGture grants, of the publicly funded drganization that
 
managed the zone. This findirig according to Osborne was reinforced by an
 
in-depth analysis of 90 enterprise zones conducted by Rodney Efickson of
 
Penn State who Concluded that"One of the key factors that bridged across all
 
of the high-performance zones was a strong, pro-active development policy"
 
Osborne concluded by asserting that deep tax incentives may shift
 
investment geographically, but that they cannot change the way the market
 
works. In or out of zones, companies still need skilled, literate employees.
 
No amount of tax incentives can entice firms to hire people who cannot
 
reach at required levels of proficiency fairly quickly. The distinction here is
 
between economic growth and economic development. Growth is simply an
 
increase in output. Development is a process through which people,
 
communities and firms increase their capacities to produce, creating an
 
upward spiral that has its own momentum. And, if these incentives were
 
crafted carefully (to help poor people rather than poor places, and to
 
minimize the amount of money wasted on investments that would have
 
been made otherwise),they could play a moderately constructive role in their
 
own right, aside from their role in guiding state and local governments.
 
Stodghill II, Gole and McGuire emphasize with the notion that Ezs are
 
a misguided idea for two reasons. First, government efforts to warp the
 
market's investment decisions are usually inept and have perverse effects.
 
Second, backdqor government sweeteners through the tax code increase the
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budget deficit as much as government spending does, but do not attract the
 
same scrutiny. They tend to be more wasteful as a result. Tax subsidies for
 
investment which have both these flaws, often cost more than the new
 
investment they generate.
 
Further, they contend that on occasion EZs have sparked costly tax-

giveaway wars between states. To underline this, they cited some examples.
 
Specific among these was the tax-giveaway war between Philadelphia,
 
Washington and Maryland. Parks Sausage Company won out after Maryland
 
offered $2.3 million in federal urban development action grants, a 10-year
 
defermenton state property taxes,a new-equipment tax credit,and $200,000 in
 
wage credits to 100 new employees.
 
They concluded that in the real world,the enterprise zones set up by
 
cities and states have a decidedly mixed record. Businesses,it seems,usually
 
base investment decisions on factors other than tax liability. They cited a
 
study done in 1989 by the General Accounting Office, Congress'investigative
 
arm which concluded that three Maryland zones did not stimulate local
 
economic growth. The GAG found that infrastructure, low crime rates, and
 
access to labor markets were more important in attracting business than were
 
tax incentives. It will never be easy to persuade companies to move to
 
rundown, crime-ridden, urban waste-lands. And with Congress worried
 
about deficits, the many supporters of enterprise zones may find that cost,in
 
the end,is an even bigger obstacle than the zones'uneven track record.
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Summary & Conclusions
 
The Reagan and Bush administration brought a renaissance to the
 
historic preference of Americans for the image of "laissez-faire" policies. The
 
idea of the government stimulating competition and entrepreneurial talent
 
has been a popular one for the past decade,and continues to receive support
 
from the Clinton Administration. Yet, there is a growing body of literature
 
that affirms the fact that business and industry today are less sensitive to the
 
kinds of tax incentives and other financial incentives provided by these
 
zones. Enterprise Zones cannot recreate for firms through tax expenditures
 
the economic dynamics that brought them to specific urban/rural locations in
 
the past.
 
Although some studies have been successful in detecting positive
 
effects of tax incentives on firms"location decisions, especially through more
 
careful model specification,(Newman and Sullivan 1988, Warner 1988 1989)
 
published research overwhelmingly suggests skepticism over the possibility
 
that "pure" enterprise zone incentives alone could generate enough
 
investment and jobs to offset costs of administering the programs; rather,the
 
increasing importance of other "quality of life" factors emerges, along with
 
energy, market access,and labor,as key factors(Wasylenko 1981, Funkhouser
 
and Lorenz1987,Vaughan 1988,Warner 1989).
 
This proliferation of conflicting research conclusions regarding state
 
incentives and economic growth simply underscores how tenuous the
 
governmenfs reliance on such policy approaches should be. In the absence of
 
definitive proof that enterprise zones do not work,and with the support of a
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few site-specific examples of enterprise zones that seem to have worked,it is
 
understandable that state and local governments and other interested parties
 
will coritihue to;favpr enterprise zones aS;one instrument for pursuing
 
economic development. In fact. Green and Brintnall (168-169), concluded
 
that enterprise Zones should be viewed as economic and political concepts,as
 
well as "a tool for achieving other state objectives," and stress the importance
 
of examining the relationship of enterprise zones to the broader process of
 
economic development and to what particular forms and combifiations of
 
policies are most effective. State-by-state comparisons continue to support the
 
conclusion that states such as Indiana and New Jersey, which emphasize
 
neighborhood or community involvement in solving a range of problems,
 
have successful zones, while states such as Connecticut, which rely on tax
 
incentives,do not(Enos,1993).
 
In short, while there is scant evidence to support the ideblogically­
oriented enterprise zone policies promoted by Stuart Butler and Jack Kemp,
 
there is much to recommend the idea that engaging a community in securing
 
its future through economic opportunity, sustainable community
 
development, community-based partnerships (true grass roots support),
 
strategic vision for change and innovation and creativity can create change.
 
This is the recurring message from both the research literature and the local
 
administrators.
 
So, although some important questions remain about the permanence
 
of the jobs created, most empirical assessments have concluded that state EZ
 
programs are effective in creating jobs at reasonable costs. Increased zone
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benefits will help economic development leaders achieve the ultimate goal of
 
eliminating the financial disadvantages of urban sites, allowing businesses to
 
focus on their merits. Allowing such opportunities and trying to boost the
 
local economic development ideas that are working the best, are the key
 
objectives of the EZ plan.
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CHAPTER III
 
: RESEARCH DESIGN
 
I Secondary Data
 
This research effort will treat Enterprise Zone as the key independent
 
variable. |
 
Various dependent variables of interest are: building permits, business
 
licenses, capital improvements, employment activity and employment
 
vouchers. ,
 
Operational Definitions of variables
 
Enterprise Zone(s): a multidimensional variable, which will measure
 
the rate of job creatioh in terms of building permits, new business licenses,
 
capital improvements,!employment activity and employment vouchers.
 
Agua Mansa: an EZ locality, 9,760 acres strategically located in the
 
western portion of Riverside and San Bernardino Counties and within the
 
cities of Colton, Rialto and Riverside. It is less than 16 miles from Ontario
 
International Airport^ served by three transcontinental railroads (Union
 
Pacific, Southern Pacific and Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe), and three major
 
freewaysdO,60,and 215). These are essential components of the need and
 
concerns of firms(Lyons and Hamlin 1991). (See Appendix I,Page 28).
 
Community long-term benefits: employment of area's residents
 
leading to decrease in area's unemployment rate, increase in community's tax
 
base, diversification and stabilization of the economic base and increase in the
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area's per capita income.
 
Building permits & new business licenses: measured by total number
 
issued in the EZ area.
 
Job creation: measured by new and expanding businesses in zone area
 
resulting in 10 or more jobs being directly created.
 
Capital improvements: measured hy new and existing infrastructure
 
projects like monument sign projects/waste water treatment plant, electrical
 
improvements and water line upgrades.
 
Employment Vouchers: hiring of disadvantaged individuals
 
(employees who are participants in programs funded or operated under the
 
Employee placement and job training). Such programs include job training
 
programs like GAIN (Greater Avenue for Independence),PICJT/JTPA/JESD
 
(Private Industry Council Job Training/Job Training Partnership Act/Jobs and
 
Employment Services Department).
 
Secondary Data Hypotheses
 
Leaders from Riverside and San Bernardino counties as well as
 
representatives from the cities of Colton. Rialto and Riverside formed a joint
 
powers agency - The Agua Mansa Industrial Growth Association(AMIGA)
 
partnership, providing businesses a variety of incentives that include state
 
income tax credits and/or deductions as welT as various financing and
 
technical assistahce programs;offered by individual localities.
 
Seven years (1986 - 1992) of AMIGA data on Agua Mansa EZ
 
community will be analyzed to test the following Hypotheses;
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*H1 Enterprise Zones create a significant(compared with existing #s) 
increase in jobs. 
*H2 Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in value of building permits 
issued. 
*H3 Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in number of building 
permits issued. 
*H4 Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in number ofnew business 
licenses issued. 
*H5 Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in value of capital 
improvements. 
*H6 Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in employment activity. 
*H7 Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in employment vouchers. 
Secondary Data Sources.
 
Seven years(1986 - 1992)of AMIGA data will provide the data base. This
 
research will also provide a data base for continuous evaluation and
 
monitoring of the relationships among EZs (job creatiori) and community
 
long term benefits.
 
Statistical Proceduresfor Secondary Data.
 
The researcher will use several statistical procedures to evaluate the
 
aforementioned hypotheses. First, a principal components analysis will be
 
performed to determine the relative contribution of building permits,
 
business licenses, capital improvements and employment activities to EZ and
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to provide a single variable score for those combined variables. Next, the
 
researcher will derive a series of regression models to investigate the
 
relationships between the indepehdent variable - EZ - and the various
 
dependent variables of interests, such as building permits, business licenses,
 
capital improvements and employment activities. Further, the researcher
 
will develop regression models to focus on the change over time in each of
 
the variables. This procedure will lead to interpretations of how EZ will
 
effect changes in the various dependent variables, reflecting the possibility
 
that EZ may produce different effects than no job creation.
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CHAPTER IV
 
Findings& Interpretations of Secondary Data.
 
Zone economic activity is measured in several ways: the number of
 
firms qualifying for EZ benefits as a result of investing in a zone, the total
 
amount of such investments, the number of jobs created, and the number of
 
jobs retained. So, within this parameter, this research focused on one
 
empirical question: How effective are Enterprise Zones in general?
 
The major deterrent to development in the Agua Mansa EZ has been
 
the lack of developable land, that is, land that can be made available to a
 
business or developer with the necessary utilities and services in place. This
 
means infrastructure completed, ready for use, and adequate for future
 
growth - a major attraction to a firm(s)looking for a new location (Lyons&
 
Hamlih, 1991). To alleviate this, several projects were and are still in
 
progress. Examples of these projects include:
 
A. Agua Mansa Industrial Center (Erin Madison Project). This is a
 
public/private development partnership of Martin Kanselbaum, Erin
 
Madison & AMIGA. Late in 1988, staff began work on the establishment of
 
Community Facilities District(CDF)#89-1,the Agua Mansa Industrial Center.
 
This Mello Roos District will provide financing for services and facilities
 
necessary to meet projected demands from commercial and industrial users
 
locating in the area. Examples are: monument sign projects, waste water
 
treatment plant, electrical improvements, water line upgrades, signal
 
improvements and fire protection facilities. The estimated cost for proposed
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facilities and services to be financed under the Mello Rocs bond program is
 
$16 million. This project will bring 300 to 500 acres of prime industrial
 
property on line for industrial development.
 
B.The City of Rialto created a Mello Roos district for the improvement
 
of roads,sewers and flood control within its jurisdictionary boundaries of the
 
EZ.
 
Since its inception, the Agua Mansa EZ has created marked increases
 
compared with existing #s in various types of business activities (value and
 
number of building permits, new business licenses, capital improvement
 
values and employment activity). For example, the total value of building
 
permits went from approximately $36.5 million in 1987 to $92.6 million in
 
1989. While number of building permits totaled 280 in 1987, in 1989 3,128
 
were issued. Total number of new business licenses Went from 18 in 1986 to
 
107 in 1989 and 134 in 1992, with a cumulative total of 558 by 1992(272%
 
increase since 1986). In 1987, capital improvement values totaled $1.7
 
million. In 1989, the total was well over $12 million and more than $27
 
million in 1992. In 1987, number of low/moderate income new hires totaled
 
15 while the number increased to 76 in 1989 and 297in 1992. See Appendices
 
II p 29, and III p 30;Tables I p 31,and II& III p 32. The Agua MansaEZshows
 
a good mix of businesses, but lean more towards manufacturing and
 
industrial. This may be attributed to the fact that since the 1930s,creating new
 
jobs by industrial recruitment has enjoyed considerable favor as a way to
 
stimulate economic development. Interest in attracting new industrial
 
manufacturing firms has continued because they provide goods that are
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largely exported outside a region and they therefore can have a dramatic,
 
sometimes immediate,impact on ernployment and income levels(Luke et al.
 
1988). Many retail service firms on the other hand,do not export,but rather
 
recirculate local wealth. These retail services tend to be local in nature and
 
therefore are seen as having less influence on local economic conditions. The
 
sharp decrease in business activity between 1989 and 1990,can be attributed to
 
the beginning of the recession in California(defense budget cuts,end of cold
 
war,etc.).
 
The Agua Mansa case research can argue that the EZ approach can
 
achieve dramatic results where EZs are accompanied by aggressive local
 
economic development policies. This demonstrates how EZs have helped to
 
bring the business community, neighborhood groups and the local
 
governments together to work on projects having economic benefits.
 
In discussions with Ms. Wendy Holland, Economic/Redevelopment
 
Project Manager for the city of Colton, the researcher had expressed some
 
concerns. Were these businesses''brandnew",that is new start-up businesses,
 
or businesses from other places moving into the area and taking advantage of
 
EZ incentives? The response was that no data exists locally or from the state,
 
and as such it is hard to tell if these businesses moved from some other
 
locations. Also there was no activity to report business retentions. \Mthin
 
this period, some businesses closed and some were created. So, the
 
conclusion is that questions of EZ program development and evaluation go
 
hand in hand. There is a need to learn more.
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Conclusion
 
Although some important questions remain about the permanence of
 
the jobs created, most empirical assessments have concluded that state EZ
 
programs are effective in creating jobs at reasonable costs. The government/
 
here, is showing great foresight in challenging businesses,local governments
 
and citizens to work together to create local solutions. Increased zone benefits
 
will help economic development leaders achieve the ultimate goal of
 
eliminating the financial disadvantages of urban sites, allowing businesses to
 
focus on their merits. Allowing such opportunities and trying to boost the
 
local economic development ideas that are working the best, are the key
 
objectives of the EZ plan.
 
Federal research guidance on how researchers can develop study
 
designs for state programs which maximize the possibilities for aggregating
 
results across studies, would be very valuable. A carefully constructed and
 
limited federal demonstration program, coordinated with existing state
 
programs, is also needed. So, we need to learn more. We need more
 
knowledge about impacts,about goals,and about process. According to Reed,
 
President Clinton's deputy assistant for economic policy (qtd. in Stackhouse
 
47), "Economic growth is the most important urban policy, the most
 
important rural policy, and the most important development policy." Some
 
of this can come from better and more extensive evaluations,especially those
 
designed with attention to external validity.
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APPENDIX I: AGUAMANSAENTERPRISEZONEMAP
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APPENDIX II:AGUAMANSAEZNEW BUSINESSLISTING 1986-1992
 
MANUFACTURING
 
CupplesPlastic Bags
 
BeallTrans Liner
 
Stackhouse
 
Lehigh Portland Cement
 
NationalPAX
 
Riverside GeneralMahufacturtng Co.
 
HallcraftIndustries
 
Benchmark Clock
 
Norsea Marine
 
Atlas Pacific
 
Doc's Hi-TechCameProducts,Inc.
 
Astro Seal,Inc.
 
Zephr Systems,Inc.
 
H&HIndustries,Inc.
 
Mark Franzen,Inc.
 
Blaine Baker Overhead Dqors
 
Wojtaszek American Creative
 
Paper Converter
 
LIGHTINDUSTRIAL
 
GTR/Western Athletics
 
So.PacificPipeline Partnership
 
Western Landscaping Construction
 
MasterPrinting
 
AAA Quality Service
 
Ruby Metals
 
Bauer Building Materials
 
Kretaschmar Steel
 
DISTRIBUTION
 
PoolWaterProducts
 
MBM Corporation
 
Niagara Water
 
J.R.HigginsLumber
 
Layton WaterService
 
Berlin Tire Center,Inc.
 
Intematinal Multi-food
 
ABG Service Corporation
 
TechnicalMetalService
 
MortanIndustries
 
DigiTec-Konica Corp.
 
INDUSTRIAL
 
WestCoast Wife&Steel
 
CWP
 
Calfon Construction
 
Lonigro Castings
 
Recat,Inc.
 
Tigon Industries
 
COMMERCIAL/RETAIL
 
plaza Las Glorias Market
 
Little CaesarsPizza
 
ThriftyDrug Store
 
Al'sGarden Art
 
REALESTATE
 
GarnerProperties
 
TrammelCrow
 
ADMINISTRATIVEOFFICES
 
Bird Products
 
RegionalHeNth Care Co.
 
ContinentalLand Title
 
International Revenue Service
 
Riverside County SheriffE)ept
 
Riverside County Materials Recovry Facility
 
SOURCE:AMIGA,1994
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APPENDIX III:
 
AGUAMANSAEZBUSINESSEXPANSION LISTING 1986-1992
 
LIGHTINDUSTRIAL
 
Sierra Aluminum
 
Kaylin Center
 
Jake Sisko
 
Ron Dobson Builders
 
Hawkins/Robertson
 
Jensen Contractors
 
Peter's Auto Body
 
INDUSTRIAL
 
Brithinee Electric
 
MANUFACTURING
 
Bourns
 
A-1 Aluminum
 
CasePowerEquipment
 
COMMERCIAURETAIL
 
BusyBee
 
JimmyD.Nichols
 
Jamie,Omar,Shaheen
 
MagnoneCo.
 
CalCorrect Craft
 
ADMINISTRATIVE
 
OFFICES
 
Riverside Radiology
 
DISTRIBUTION
 
Arrowhead WaterCompany
 
REALESTATE
 
Koll Business Center
 
SOURCE:AMIGA,1994
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TABLE I:
 
SUMMARYAGUAMANSAENTERPRISEZONEBUSINESS ACTIVITY 1986-1992
 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
 
(Six Months)
 
TotalValue ofBuilding Permits $15,287,991 $36,429,035 $52,242,555 $92,604,110 $9,337,093
 
TotalNo.ofBuilding Permits 177 280 270 3,128 159
 
TotalNo.ofNew Bus.Licenses 18 113 A 102 107 22
 
CapitalImprovementValues N/A $1,714,000 $11,101,503 $12,295,632 $2,567,789
 
Employment Activity: :n/a 15 '22'.^ 76 145
 
(No.ofLow/Moderate
 
Income New Hires)
 
1991 1992 Cumulative Total
 
Total Value ofBuilding Permits $23,688,960 $14,911,348 $244,501,092
 
TotalNo.ofBuilding Permits 287 199 4500
 
Total No.ofNew Bus.Licenses 62 134 558
 
CapitalImprovementValues $18,840,000 $27,171,516 $73,690,440
 
EmploymentActivity 144 297 699
 
(No.ofLow/Moderate
 
Income New Hires)
 
SOURCE:AMIGA,1994
 
*272% INCREASEINTOTAL NUMBEROFNEWBUSINESSLICENSES
 
BETWEEN1986&1992
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TABLE H:
 
AGUA MANSAEZ
 
NEW BUSINESSLISTING 1986-1992
 
NEW BUSINESSES NO. %
 
MANUFACTURING 18 33%
 
DISTRIBUTION 11 20%
 
L/INDUSTRIAL 8 15%
 
INDUSTRIAL 6 11%
 
COMM/RETAIL 4 7%
 
ADMIN/OFFICES 6 11%
 
REALESTATE 2 4%
 
TOTAL 55 100%
 
TABLE III:
 
AGUA MANSAEZ
 
BUSINESSEXPANSION LISTING 1986 ■-1992
 
BUSINESSES NO. % 
MANUFACTURING 16% ; 
DISTRIBUTION 1 5% 
L/INDUSTRIAL ,/ ■ 37% 
INDUSTRIAL 1 5%
 
COMM/RETAIL 5 26%
 
ADMIN/OFFICES 1 5%
 
REALESTATE 1 5%
 
TOTAL 19 100%
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